Update December 2022: added “inline-signing yes;” to the zone statement as BIND 9.16.33, 9.18.7 and newer requires an explicit statement for zones without a configured ‘allow-update’ or ‘update-policy’ (see KB).
BIND 9.16 has improved DNSSEC support to the point where it can (finally) be called simple to use. This is excellent news for DNS administrators because it means there are now several options (viable alternatives being Knot DNS or PowerDNS) which make DNSSEC simple to deploy.
Six years ago we wrote a blog post about BIND 9.9 and its new in-line signing support. This article got a lot of views but at some point we had to put a warning message on the blog post stating vaguely that we would not recommend the method described anymore. The main reason was that DNSSEC with BIND 9.9 still contained many manual steps which could not be configured in named.conf. Especially key roll-overs caused headaches for administrators. If you cannot upgrade to BIND 9.16 the old blog post might still be useful. But in this case, we recommend to omit key roll-overs altogether.
However, now that we have BIND 9.16, you can just make some configuration changes to named.conf and it’s all done. Now let’s take a closer look on how you can enable DNSSEC for your domain name.
We used Debian 10 (aka buster) which comes with BIND 9.11 at the time of writing. We used the BIND9 packages provided by ISC, who offer BIND 9.16 in the “BIND 9 Stable” repository. Please head over to ISC Packages for BIND 9 for instructions on how to use the ISC packages directly.
Once you have added the ISC BIND 9 Stable repository we install bind9, bind9 utils and the bind documentation:
apt-get install bind9 bind9-dnsutils bind9-doc
You have now a running bind9 instance. You can check its running state with systemctl:
The Swiss Federal council adopted the lower laws to the telecommunicaiton act today. Amongst it is the Ordinance on Internet Domains that also regulates the ccTLD .ch. SWITCH-CERT welcomes the new ordinance and the smart regulation by the Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM). The Ordinance on Internet Domains will come to power on 1.1.2021 and has some important changes.
The most obvious ist that the personal data of domain holders will no longer be published in the public whois, following other European countries and the GDPR. This is an important change to protect the privacy of Domain holders. There will be a regulated and monitored access for Swiss Authorities and others that require that data for fighting cybercrime or have other legitimate reasons to get access to the identity of a domain holder. You can find more information on the SWITCH website.
Not so obvious, but from the CERT and security persepective as important is that the .ch zone file will be published as a whole. While the data about (active) .ch domains itself has been published in the distributed Domain Name System ever since, the file containing all domain names – the .ch “zone” – was never public. This will change as of January 2021, details on how to access the .ch zone file will be published at the SWITCH open data page soon.
Cyber Security Month with GÉANT – “Become a cyber hero”
The European data network for the research and education community GÉANT interconnects national research and education networks (NRENs) like SWITCH across Europe, enabling collaboration virtually and accelerate research, drive innovation and enrich education.
Also this year GÉANT joins the European Cyber Security Month, an initiative launched by ENISA, EC DG CONNECT and a variety of partners, to raise security awareness within the European community. With the tagline «Become a cyber hero» GÉANT publishes practical tips, case studies and articles on social engineering, phishing, password security and ransomware throughout October. The content is provided by experts within the community.
SWITCH-CERT is proud to share with you one of the interesting contributions from the Swiss NREN. Read about Björn Abt, IT Security Officer at the Paul Scherrer Institut (PSI), talking about their approach to security awareness:
Open security standards are essential for a secure and resilient Internet in Switzerland and protect the privacy of Swiss Internet users. The adoption rate for Internet security standards like DNSSEC, DANE and DMARC in Switzerland is still low compared to the leading countries in Europe, but there is more and more support from the Internet industry, authorities and not for profit organizations in Switzerland.
Why are open security standards so important?
The implementation of open security standards that come out of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), reduce the attack surface of the domain/service owner. But even more important, a growing implementation rate reduces the attack surface of the internet as a whole and makes the life of cyber criminals and state actors more challenging. Open security standards provide different mechanisms to secure our communication on the internet, most important encryption and authentication. Encryption keeps our communication on the internet confidential and prevents third parties from reading our emails and tracking on which web sites users spend their time. Authentication allows us to identify and authenticate our communications partners, it makes sure that we are not on a fake website or send emails or our login credentials to a rogue email server. Continue reading “Growing support for open security standards in Switzerland”
The event is cancelled due to the COVID-19 situation in Switzerland and Europe. We’re in contact with CIRCL and will try to find a new date as soon as the current situation is back to normal.
SWITCH is organising more MISP Trainings in Switzerland together with CIRCL, the creators of MISP.
This year, we offer two days of MISP training in our Office at Werdstrasse 2 in Zürich.
This is an advanced training for users who have already bit of knowledge of MISP and requires the knowledge of the “MISP Training – Threat Intelligence Introduction for Analysts and Administrors” training.
Use the links above to get more information an register for the trainings.
Imagine you want to visit your online banking website «www.example-bank.ch». Now, instead of getting the correct IP address your computer gets manipulated information and connects you to a website that is owned by a criminal. You wouldn’t notice but disclose your online banking credentials to the attacker.
Luckily, DNSSEC is here to help. The extension of DNS protects you from being misled and helps you reach exactly the address you typed into your browser. A complex cryptographic process makes sure, that you’re always at the right place.
100’000 .ch domain names are signed with DNSSEC
In late December 2019 the .ch zone achieved a milestone with 100’000 DNSSEC secured domains. DNSSEC adds digital signatures to DNS answers and helps to mitigate attacks on DNS name resolution.
The percentage of .ch domain names that are signed is still below 5%, but is rising thanks to a few registrars like Infomaniak, OVH, Firestorm and netzone that sign domain names for their customers by default. The number of DNSSEC signed .ch domain names rose 54% from 1.1.2019 to 1.1.2020.
Top .ch domain names are just average regarding domain name security
SWITCH operates recursive name servers for its constituency, the Swiss research and education network. Over the last year we have continually added support for transport encryption protocols on our recursive name servers such as DNS over TLS (DoT) and more recently DNS over HTTPS (DoH).
In contrast to default unencrypted DNS which runs over UDP/TCP Port 53 , both of these standards (DoT, DoH) use encrypted protocols which provide privacy for DNS queries between the client (application) and the recursive name server. This eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries on the network.
Our motivation for enabling encrypted DNS protocols on our recursive name servers have been that some client applications (mostly Android 9) probe for DoT support and use it if available by default. Over the last year, other widely used applications have added support for encrypted DNS protocols. Most notably the web browser Mozilla Firefox which supports DoH but has not turned it on by default.
Opportunistic encryption of DNS queries and responses as it is used by Android 9 by default is one use case of DoT. However, some users want to pin a specific recursive name server regardless in which network they are or also to authenticate the name server. To support this use case, we have opened our recursive name servers over encrypted transport protocols to the Internet. You will find more information about the SWITCH Public DNS service and how to use it on this website:
Talos, the intelligence group of CISCO reported in their blog that their monitoring shows that attacks on the domain name system (DNS) by “Sea Turtle” continue. The attack technique used is similar than before, the actors compromise name server records to take ownership of the domain. They then provide false information to selected parties (e.g certificate authorities, mail users) which leads to the disclosure of email credentials of the targeted organisations. These credentials give initial access to the victims E-mails accounts and other resources and are a starting point for further attacks.
Victims in Switzerland
For the first time, Talos also reported victims in Switzerland.
While Talos didn’t disclose the targeted organizations they identified these groups as primary targets: